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The peculiar structure of Newton’s first published paper on light and colors has been 
the subject of an astonishing diversity of readings: to date, scholars still do not agree as 
to what Newton wanted to prove in this paper or how he proved it.1 The structure of the 
paper is far from transparent. It consists of two very different parts: a historical account 
of what Newton called his “crucial experiment,” and a “doctrine of colors” consisting 
of thirteen propositions and an illustrative experiment. Equally debated has been the 
“style” of Newton’s demonstration.2 Newton begins the first part with an extensive his-
torical account of how he became interested in the “celebrated phenomena of colors” 
and later reached one of its major results:  that the shape of the spectrum refracted 
*  Research for this paper has been supported by the grant PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-0719, “From 
Natural History to Science,” awarded by the CNCS.
1 The paper has been read, in turns, as a formal blunder of a young upstart who dared to make 
a clear break with the mitigated skepticism and anti-dogmatism of the Royal Society, and as a 
brilliant exercise of rhetoric aiming to rewrite in the “scientific style of the day” the results of six 
long years of optical research. The reason for the exercise of rhetoric has also been the subject 
of fierce debates. For the first view, see Bechler (1974). For a representative selection of papers 
debating the second view, see Schaffer (1989), Shapiro (1996), Zemplén and Demeter (2010). See 
also Lohne (1968).
2 Following I. B. Cohen (1982, 1980), a general trend in Newtonian studies has been to distin-
guish between the “mathematical style” of the Principia and the “empirical style” of the Opticks. 
This distinction was very much in accord with the famous Kuhnian (1977) divide between 
“mathematical” and Baconian traditions in early modern Europe. In contrast, more recent arti-
cles have tried to establish an opposite view, arguing for a unity of style in Newton’s methodology. 
This has been done either by giving a more general interpretation of Newton’s “deduction from 
phenomena,” or by emphasizing the strong empirical component of Newton’s Principia. For the 
first, see Worall (2000); for the second, see Ducheyne (2011), Harper (2011), and Stein (2002).
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40 The Roots of Newton's Experimental Method
through a prism is oblong rather than circular. It is by all accounts a weird historical 
reconstruction of more than six years of optical research and two sets of very sophisti-
cated optical lectures taught at Cambridge in 1670–1672.3
There is even less agreement as to why Newton chose to write his first published 
paper in this peculiar style, employing elements borrowed from mixed-mathematics 
and natural history. Some scholars have seen it as an attempt to reconstruct an earlier 
discovery in terms of Baconian induction,4 or even an attempt to explicitly tailor new 
discoveries to follow the methodological prescriptions of the Royal Society.5 Others 
saw it as a proof that Newton used experiments in an entirely new way.6
Such diversity of opinions is hardly surprising. On the one hand, the issue has 
wider implications on the thorny problem of Newton’s method. It raises important 
methodological and epistemological questions such as the relation between theory 
and experiments, “facts” and inductive generalizations, and natural history and natu-
ral philosophy. On the other hand, reading Newton’s first paper in historical context 
raises intricate questions regarding historical influences. How much of Newton’s early 
experimental style was indebted to, and influenced by, the Baconian method of natural 
history and by Baconian experimental practices of the early Royal Society?
To further complicate matters, the methodological and the historical aspects are 
often interconnected. In order to understand Newton’s use of terms and the peculiar 
form of his demonstration, a contextual reading is often unavoidable. Unfortunately, 
most contextual analyses have so far worked with idiosyncratic views of Baconian 
method and Baconian experimental philosophy originating in the famous Kuhnian 
3 See for example the debate between Shapiro and Shaffer on the reasons and extent of this 
reconstruction, Schaffer (1989), Shapiro (1980, 2008).
4 Dear (1985), Lohne (1968).
5 In an influential article, Feinghold has considered Newton’s first publication as written in a style 
that pays lip service to the standards of writing imposed by the early Royal Society, standards 
that Newton never liked and soon abandoned in order to propose an alternative, “mathemati-
cal” style. For Feingold (2001), the divide between “mathematicians” and “natural historians” 
within the Royal Society best characterizes the Society’s purpose and functioning and the debates 
sparked by Newton’s first paper and Newton’s subsequent withdrawal from discussions are seen 
as a proof that Newton “came to consider the Royal Society a forum inhospitable for his beliefs” 
(p. 84).
6 In a series of papers and a book, Ben-Chaim argues that Newton uses experiments in a new 
way:  not as aids or illustrations for a theory, but as tools and instruments of practical learn-
ing. Moreover, he argues, this transformation is coupled to a new ‘scientific style,’ in many ways 
similar to mid-seventeenth-century sermonical style. Ben-Chaim particularly investigates the 
similarities of Newton’s scientific style with Wilkins’ writings on the style of preaching. In this 
paper, I will endorse some of Ben-Chaim’s conclusions regarding the transformation of the role 
and purpose of experiment, but also will give a different interpretation of Newton’s “style” as 
more Baconian than is recognized by most contemporary Newtonian scholars. See Ben-Chaim 
(1998, 2004, 2001).
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divide between traditional (mathematical) and Baconian sciences. Accordingly, such 
analyses saw Baconian natural history as a quite-random, theory-free activity of gather-
ing “facts,” in stark contrast with Newton’s highly theoretical experimental philosophy.
Recent developments in the field of Baconian studies have seriously amended this 
traditional (Kuhnian) picture. Due to the seminal work of Graham Rees and his stu-
dents, it has become impossible nowadays to neglect a certain “scientific” Baconianism, 
developed in Francis Bacon’s late natural and experimental histories.7 Important stud-
ies written in the past two decades have emphasized the complexity and theoretical 
structure underpinning Bacon’s experimentation and his natural histories.8 Moreover, 
Peter Anstey and Michael Hunter have shown that Bacon’s natural historical meth-
odology had a much wider influence upon seventeenth-century experimental natural 
philosophy (Newton included) than previously thought.9
My paper investigates the “Baconianism” of Newton’s first published paper in the 
light of these recent developments in scholarship. My thesis is simple:  in his paper, 
Newton used important elements of Baconian natural history. Although much remains 
to be done, it has become clearer due to the above-mentioned research that Baconian 
natural histories are not simply storehouses of “facts” and materials for the building 
of a reformed natural philosophy. They have a complex structure and contain inbuilt 
theoretical and methodological elements. For example, they contain an open-ended 
(often explicitly collaborative) series of observations and experiments, often developed 
one from the other through variations of experimental parameters. They contain pro-
visional and preliminary theoretical results (often called rules, or axioms), method-
ological and epistemological considerations, and refutations of established theories.
My aim in this paper is to identify some such elements of Baconian natural history 
in Newton’s first paper on light and colors. I begin by showing that the construction of 
Newton’s paper follows some of Bacon’s rules for writing a natural history. I will then 
show that the way in which Newton presents the development of his crucial experi-
ment has features similar to Francis Bacon’s art of utilizing experiments for producing 
knowledge in his natural and experimental histories. I exemplify my general claim by 
a particular example taken from Francis Bacon’s Historia densi et rari (1658). I show 
that there are interesting similarities between the ways in which Bacon and Newton 
use strings of experiments of successive generality in order to construct and establish 
(beyond any reasonable doubt) “phenomena” and theoretical results.
7 See Graham Rees’ introductions to Volumes 12 and 13 of the new Oxford Francis Bacon edi-
tion (Bacon 2007, Bacon 2000). I  will hereafter refer all quotes from Bacon to this edition, 
abbreviated OFB.
8 For more detailed discussion and bibliographical references, see Corneanu, Giglioni, and 
Jalobeanu (2012).
9 Anstey (2004), Anstey and Hunter (2008), Hunter (2007).
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It is important to note that the focus of this historical and philosophical recon-
struction is not primarily to establish historical influence. Newton owned a copy of 
Bacon’s Historia densi et rari and most probably read it.10 The experiment I am going 
to discuss is dog-eared in his copy. However, as with many other experimental natural 
philosophers of the late seventeenth-century, Newton reflected critically and creatively 
on Bacon, and developed his own particular brand of Baconian natural history. In this, 
he closely followed Robert Hooke’s research, as reported in the section on colors from 
Micrographia (1665). In the last part of this article, I show that reading Newton’s paper 
as a contribution to the early 1670s lively epistemological and methodological debate 
over the purpose, methods, and extent of Baconian natural history (and attached 
methodology of experimentation) clarifies some of the early critiques Newton’s paper 
received from his correspondents and contenders (most notably from Robert Hooke).
2.1 NEWTON’S HISTORICAL ACCOUNT AND METHOD 
OF INQUIRY: FROM THE INVESTIGATION OF THE 
SPECTRUM TO THE CRUCIAL EXPERIMENT
Newton’s paper has two clearly distinguished parts: a “historical” account culminating 
with the experimentum crucis and the establishment of the ‘fact’ that light is made of 
rays of different refrangibility, and his “new doctrine” of light and colors exposed in 
thirteen propositions. The second part ends with an illustrative experiment aiming 
to show the possibility of “recomposing” white light. Although each of the two parts 
has its own peculiarities, the “historical” account has raised most questions and has 
produced most puzzles.11
The paper begins thus:
To perform my late promise to you, I shall without ceremony acquaint you, that 
in the beginning of the year 1666 . . . I procured me a triangular glass-prisme, to 
try therewith the celebrated phenomena of colours. And In order thereto having 
10 See the entry [H109], Bacon, Francis. Opuscula varia posthuma, philosophica, civilia, et 
theologica, nunc primum edita. Cura & fide G. Rawley. Una cum nobilissimi auctoris vita. 8°, 
Londini, 1658 (Harrison 1968). According to Harrison, the book is dog-eared at page 17, which 
is precisely at the experiment discussed in the fifth section of my paper.
11 The peculiarity of this historical account has been characterized by Schaffer (1989) as fol-
lows: “In the letter to Oldenburg of February 1672 Newton selected some of his earlier trials, 
rewrote his autobiography, omitted many important details—notably those on prism quality and 
design—and revised some of the lessons these experiments were supposed to teach. The experi-
mentum crucis was a simplified and revised form of large numbers of experiments given in the 
3rd and 6th of Cambridge lectures” (p. 84).
AQ: The 
referenced 
source in 
Chapter 2, 
Footnote 10 
([H109]) will 
need to be 
updated.
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darkened my chamber, and made a small hole in my window-shuts, to let in a 
convenient quantity of the Suns light, I placed my Prisme at his entrance, that 
it might be thereby refracted to the opposite wall. It was at first a very pleasing 
divertisement, to view the vivid and intense colours produced thereby; but after a 
while applying myself to consider them more circumspectly, I became surprised 
to see them in an oblong form; which, according to the received laws of refraction, 
I expected should have been circular.12
Newton recounts here in an abridged form a multitude of experiments—all quite well 
known to his contemporaries—and establishes the experimental fact to be the subject 
of further investigation:  the oblong form of the spectrum. Newton’s adversaries in the 
subsequent debates (Hooke, Pardies, Lucas, etc.) were not all able to replicate the oblong 
spectrum, mainly because in order to obtain the spectrum and not a colored “prismatical 
iris,”13 both the prism and the screen have to be placed in certain positions, yet Newton 
does not note precise positions. Rather, in the development of his historical account, he 
presents his reader with a string of experiments generated through experimental varia-
tion of various parameters: the thickness of glass, the dimension of the hole in the curtain 
admitting light, and the position of the prism with respect to the hole. As a result of this 
first string of experiments, Newton concludes that the effect discovered does not depend 
on any of the above parameters, and that “the fashion of the colors was in all these cases 
the same.”
In a second string of experiments, Newton addresses a more theoretical question: Is the 
phenomenon produced only when a ray of light is decomposed by a prism? Perhaps 
some “contingent irregularity” of the prismatic refraction is the cause of the oblong spec-
trum. This question is investigated through a more elaborate experiment, one with two 
prisms: the first prism decomposes the incoming white light, the second receives the spec-
trum and produces, on the screen, an “orbicular” shape.14 Newton concludes at this point 
that “what ever was the cause of that length, ’twas not any contingent irregularity” [in the 
prism].15
12 Newton (1672a, pp. 3076–3077).
13 Which is what Robert Boyle has “established” as a result of the experiment, in his natural and 
experimental history of colors. For Boyle’s prismatic experiments, see Boyle (1664, p.  191ff.). 
Boyle’s prismatic experiments are recorded under the general (Baconian) heading “Promiscuous 
Experiments about Colors.”
14 Instead of elongating the oblong shape further, the introduction of a second prism seems to 
have a “contrary” effect, re-creating the orbicular shape one expects to encounter in the first 
place. This is an ingenious way of generalizing the discussion beyond mere prismatic refraction. 
It allows Newton to claim that whatever is the cause of the oblong shape in the first place has to 
do with the properties of light and not with prismatic refraction.
15 Newton (1672a, p. 3076).
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A third string of experiments has to do with the variation of another experimen-
tal condition:  the angle of incidence of rays coming from “divers parts of the Sun.” 
Interestingly enough, these strings of experiments conclude with a rather unexpected 
theoretical result:  a refutation of Descartes’ corpuscularian theory of light. Without 
mentioning Descartes by name, Newton claims that light cannot be made of corpuscles 
similar to “tennis balls” (like in the famous drawing of Descartes’ Dioptrics) for the 
simple reason that the “oblique passage” of such tennis balls would encounter more 
resistance on one side than on the other:
Then I began to suspect, whether the Rays, after their trajection through the 
Prisme, did not move in curve lines, and according to their more or less curvity 
tend to divers parts of the wall. And it increased my suspition, when I remem-
bered that I had often seen a Tennis ball, struck with an oblique Racket, describe 
such a curve line. For, a circular as well as a progressive motion being commu-
nicated to it by that stroak, its parts on that side, where the motions conspire, 
must press and beat the contiguous Air more violently than on the other, and 
there excite a reluctancy and reaction of the Air proportionably greater. And 
for the same reason, if the Rays of light should possibly be globular bodies, 
and by their oblique passage out of one medium into another acquire circulat-
ing motion, they ought to feel the greater resistance from the ambient Æther 
on that side, where motions conspire, and thence be continually bowed to the 
other. But notwithstanding this plausible ground for suspition, when I came to 
examine it, I could observe no such curvity in them.16
At this point of the paper, Newton introduces his experimentum crucis, which can 
also be viewed as a supplementary construction added to the first experimental setup: the 
spectrum decomposed by the first prism is sent not onto a screen but onto two pierced 
screens and parts of it are further refracted using a second prism. Newton condenses into 
a very short description (with no geometrical figure attached) a series of experiments in 
which, by rotating the first prism, various regions/colors of the initial spectrum are fur-
ther decomposed by a second prism and seen at various locations on a third screen. The 
results of the experimentum crucis are expressed rather obscurely in the following way:
And I saw by the variation of those places [on the final screen], that the light, 
tending to that end of the Image, towards which the refraction of the first 
Prisme was made, did in the second Prisme suffer a Refraction considerably 
greater then the light tending to the other end.17
16 Newton (1672a, p. 3078).
17 Newton (1672a, p. 3079).
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As Stein (2004) has shown, the awkward way in which Newton expresses his major 
result is mainly due to his struggle to describe the experiment and the experimental 
fact without speaking about colors. What Newton claimed to have observed as a result 
of his experimentum crucis was how the change of colors incident on the second prism 
affected the deviation of the image on the third screen: the red part of the spectrum, 
for example, was less deviated than the violet part. From this Newton concluded that 
“the true cause of the length of that Image [the oblong form of the spectrum] was 
detected to be no other than that Light consists of Rays differently refrangible, which, 
without any respect to a difference in their incidence, were, according to their degrees 
of refrangiblity, transmitted towards divers parts of the wall.”18
It is quite interesting that what we take (in light of Newton’s subsequent work on 
optics) to be the main theoretical result of the paper is expressed in rather obscure 
terms and is not developed and explained. The claim that light consists of rays with 
different degrees of refrangibility is embedded in a “history”: multiple series of experi-
ments, experimental results of increased generality, methodological considerations, 
descriptions of the experimental setups, and practical consequences followed by what 
Newton himself describes as a “digression,” or a history of the idea, plan, and construc-
tion of the reflecting telescope presented to the Royal Society in the same year (1672).19 
This move in Newton’s paper has often been portrayed as sheer rhetoric:  Newton 
attempted to give weight to what is at best a sketchy demonstration by showing its 
practical/technical applications. The overall character of the paper is not made clearer 
by the fact that what follows after the practical “digression” is yet another kind of con-
tent, namely his “new doctrine” of colors, apparently unrelated to the first part of the 
paper, summarized in thirteen propositions without demonstrations.
All in all, peculiarities of structure and style apart, the first part of Newton’s paper 
seems to claim that strings of experiments give rise to a number of results of increased 
generality. Modern readers tend to distinguish among Newton’s results, saying that 
some are experimental results (the oblong form of the spectrum), some are theoretical 
results (the proposition “light consists of rays of different refragibility”) and some are 
practical results (the reflecting telescope). This is not, however, how Newton’s paper 
presents them. They are introduced as experimental results of increasing generality, 
culminating with the causal explanation of the oblong spectrum.20
18  Ibid.
19 Newton (1672b).
20 Newton referred often to the factual character of this discovery in his correspondence with 
Hooke and others. Even if subtle inconsistencies appear in the way he explained the results of his 
crucial experiment at one stage or another in his debate with Robert Hooke, or father Lucas, they 
are mostly connected with the question whether his theory of colors is intrinsically coupled with 
that of light. See Zemplén and Demeter (2010).
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Although arguably peculiar for modern readers, this expositive and demonstrative 
structure was widespread in the experimental research of the early Royal Society. Take 
for example Robert Hooke’s famous investigation of the same “celebrated phenomena 
of colors” in Micrographia. What is entitled “Observ. IX” of Micrographia has indeed a 
very similar structure. It begins with the presentation of curious phenomena of spectral 
decomposition in Lapis specularis, or Muscovy Glass, “a body that seems to have as 
many Curiosities in its Fabrick as any common Mineral I have met with.”21 Because of 
its curious nature, Hooke claims that the “history” of this body “does afford better ways 
of examining” the production and variation of colors than the study of peacocks’ feath-
ers. Hooke uses “history” here with the same meaning as Newton, Bacon, and most of 
their contemporaries, i.e., in the sense of careful and systematic inquiry.22 Like Newton, 
his history also begins with “an exceedingly pleasant and not less instructive Spectacle”:
And that is, if curiosity and diligence be used, you may so split this admirable 
substance [Muscovy Glass] that you may have pretty large Plates . . .  . Each of 
them appearing through the Microscope most curiously, intirely and uniformly 
adorned with some one vivid colour:  this, if examined with the Microscope, 
may be plainly perceived to be in all parts of it equally thick. Two, three or 
more of these lying one upon another, exhibit oftentimes curious compounded 
colours, which produce such a Compositum, as one would scarce imagine 
should be the result of such ingredients: As perhaps a faint yellow and a blew 
may produce a very deep purple. But when anon we come to the more strict 
examination of these Phenomena, and to inquire into the causes and reasons 
of these productions, we shall, I hope, make it more conceivable how they are 
produced, and shew them to be no other then the natural and necessary effects 
arising from the peculiar union of concurrent causes.23
In developing the subsequent “history,” Hooke offers strings of experiments and 
observations leading to results of increasing generality. First, he demonstrates that the 
“phenomena of colors” (the appearance of “irises or colored lines”24) are not restricted 
to Muscovy Glass but can be reproduced with sufficiently thin plates made of any 
transparent substance.25 After having established the “generality or universality of this 
21 Hooke (1665, p. 47).
22 This is also the sense in which Renaissance naturalists used “natural history,” following Pliny’s 
Historia naturalis. For a discussion, see Jalobeanu (2012a).
23 Hooke (1665, p. 49).
24 Ibid., p. 50.
25 Hooke does not limit the research to thin plates of glass, but inquires into the same phenom-
ena produced in soap and glass bubbles, organic materials, watered steel, etc.; Ibid., pp. 50–51.
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propriety,” the history develops further with other, more complex strings of experi-
ments destined to determine which parameters are relevant for the production of 
colors. Hooke establishes thus that the experimental result does not depend on the 
source of light,26 on the matter of which the thin plate is made, or on the matter of 
the medium between two thin plates.27 It is worth pointing out that Hooke’s historical 
account also ends with a crucial experiment destined to refute Descartes’ theory of 
the production of colors (of which, find more in the last section of this paper), after 
which Observation IX continues with a general “discourse” concerning the “nature 
of Light and Refraction.” Although Hooke’s text is dense and not separated by head-
ings, its discursive structure is fairly clear and is astonishingly similar to the structure 
of Newton’s first paper: a historical account composed of strings of experiments des-
tined to prove experimental and theoretical results of increasing generality, a “crucial 
experiment,” and a section positing an affirmative (in Hooke’s case, also hypothetical) 
doctrine regarding the nature and properties of light.
This careful textual separation between “history” and “theory” (doctrine) and the 
particular ordering destined to create the impression that the doctrine/hypothesis is 
constructed upon natural history are other important features of Baconian natural 
history28 that gets incorporated into the “scientific style” of mid-seventeenth-century 
experimental natural philosophy.29
In order to clarify these and other peculiar features of Newton’s first paper, in the 
next section I offer a textual reconstruction of Bacon’s conception of natural history 
and his method for producing natural histories. Then, I will turn to a particular exam-
ple, putting in parallel Newton’s and Bacon’s experimental procedures.
2.2 THE CONSTRUCTION OF BACONIAN 
NATURAL HISTORIES
There is a persistent tendency among historians and philosophers of science to espouse 
a caricature view according to which Baconian natural histories are large collections of 
26 Repeating the string of experiments with various sources of light, from the light coming 
directly from the sun, to different angles of incidence, and finally to the light of a candle; Ibid., 
pp. 53–54.
27 Ibid., pp. 50–53.
28 One can find a very similar structure in Boyle. Boyle writes, for example: “I must desire that 
you would look upon this little Treatise, not as a Discourse written Principally to maintain any 
of the fore-mentioned Theories . . . or substitute a New one of my Own, but as the beginning of a 
new History of Colours, upon which, when you and yours Ingenious friends shall have Enriched 
it, a Solid Theory may be safely built” (Boyle 1664, pp. 88–89).
29 Anstey (2002, 2004, 2005).
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observations about nature, mostly repetitive and purely qualitative.30 In the past decades, 
however, substantial studies have shown that this caricature view is false in almost all 
its details. Bacon’s natural histories are often quantitative,31 they make use of instru-
ments and elaborated experimental techniques,32 they are often generated from a limited 
number of privileged and relevant experiments, and have a rich underlying theoretical 
structure.33 Moreover, Bacon often reflected upon how to construct natural histories and 
wrote several methodological and philosophical texts on the very procedure of generat-
ing experiments and recording such histories.34 In one of them, entitled “Preparative 
to a Natural History,”35 Bacon enumerates a set of ten rules or “general instructions” on 
how to write what he calls a “primary natural history” (or “mother history”),36 i.e., the 
simplest and most general form of natural history that can serve as basis for further work 
in natural history and natural philosophy alike. The same work also contains hints at 
more elaborate, more theoretical natural histories halfway between this “primary” his-
tory and natural philosophy, properly speaking: what Bacon used to call “a middle term, 
so to speak, between history and philosophy.”37 These rules/directions are not always 
clear partly because Bacon often shifts between the two meanings of natural history 
mentioned above,38 and partly because they have to be read in conjunction with certain 
aphorisms from the first and second parts of the Novum organum. To the extent that 
their meaning can be reconstructed from Bacon’s writings, it seems that such directions 
30 The view originates most probably in the influential Kuhn (1977). It can still be found with 
slight emendations in Daston (1991), Dear (1995, 2006), and Findlen (1995).
31 See for example Pastorino (2011), Pérez-Ramos (1990), and Rees (1985).
32 Stewart (2012), Weeks (2008).
33 Jalobeanu (2010b, 2012a, 2013), Zagorin (1998, pp. 113–129).
34 Jalobeanu (2012a). I have divided Bacon’s natural historical works into works of natural his-
tory and works about natural history. Representative natural histories are the Latin natural his-
tories that Bacon wrote in the last five years of his life under the generic title Historia naturalis et 
experimentalis. The finished ones are Historia ventorum, Historia densi et rari, and Historia vitae 
et mortis. There also exist a number of fragments and manuscripts of other natural histories in 
various stages of completions. As for Bacon’s works about natural history, I take as representa-
tive works like “Parasceve” (“Prerparative to a Natural History”), the fragments on natural his-
tory from the preface to Instauratio magna, Distributio operis, the preface to Historia naturalis 
et experimentalis, the lists of 130 histories appended to Novum organum, the fragment called 
“Descriptio globi intellectualis” and the fragments on natural history from De augmentis scien-
tiarum. Also, an important work about natural history is New Atlantis.
35 Parasceve ad historiam naturalem was a part of the 1620s edition of Instauratio Magna. It 
contained two parts: A description of natural and experimental history of the kind fit to serve as 
a plan for the basis and foundation of the true philosophy, and Aphorisms on the construction of a 
primary history. It was also translated in English and published in 1670 both separately and as a 
part of Bacon (1670).
36 OFB, vol. 11, p. 453.
37 As for an example in Descriptio globi intellectualis, OFB, vol. 5, pp. 109–110.
38 For the evolution of Bacon’s conception of natural history, see Anstey (2012).
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for writing natural history govern both the process of experimentation (i.e., production 
of natural historical ‘facts’) and the process of recording such experimentation.
For Bacon, a natural and experimental history begins with specially selected and 
highly relevant sets of experiments of light, i.e., “experiments of no use in themselves 
but which only contribute to the discovery of causes.”39 Such experiments are not mere 
observations, but complex procedures through which the experimenter vexes Nature, 
stripping “the mask and veil from natural things which generally lie concealed or 
hidden beneath a variety of shapes and outward appearances.”40 They involve a long, 
painstaking, often repetitive process of counting, weighting, measuring, defining, or, as 
Bacon puts it “a good marriage of Physics and Mathematics.”41 Constructing a natural 
history also implies a selection; the experimenter has to choose, from the multitude 
of natural phenomena, the relevant trials and the productive experiments.42 Bacon 
implies that there are, among the experiments of light, particularly informative experi-
ments, experiments able either to illuminate or improve the senses, or able to act as 
interesting shortcuts in the attempts to understand nature, or which are simply closer 
to theoretical generalizations. They can be of great help for the investigator of nature. 
Such are what he calls prerogative instances, or instances of special power (ISP).43 An 
important rule for constructing natural histories is to look for precisely such instances:
But for the selection of the most important instances of every sort (which 
should be sought out and as it were tracked down with all the determination at 
our command) we must look to our Instances with Special Powers.44
39 Novum organum, Book I, Aph. 99, OFB, vol. 11, 158–159. Bacon’s own natural and experimen-
tal histories are all centered upon such sets.
40 Novum organum, Book I, Aph. 5, OFB, vol. 11, p. 463.
41 Novum organum, Book I, Aph. 7, OFB, vol. 11, p. 465. See also OFB vol. 11, pp. 366–368: “The 
powers and actions of bodies are circumscribed and measured either by point in space, moment 
of time, concentration of quantity, or ascendancy of virtue, and unless these four have been 
well and carefully weighed up, the sciences will perhaps be pretty as speculation, but fall flat 
in practice.” On the quantitative aspects of Bacon’s natural histories, see Pastorino (2011), Rees 
(1985, 1986).
42 This selective procedure is described in Sylva Sylvarum (Bacon 1627, p. 7) in the following 
way: “The rejection which I continually use of experiments (though appeareth not) is infinite.”
43 ISPs are particular classes of experiments of light, identified by Bacon as useful shortcuts in 
the exploration of nature. They can play a variety of roles in the construction of natural histories, 
but they are theoretically oriented and can lead from natural history to the next stage, the devel-
opment of a more theoretical natural philosophy. The doctrine of ISP is among the unfinished 
parts of Bacon’s programs and all that is left of it is the long list of twenty-seven ISPs ending the 
second book of Novum organum. However, Bacon successfully used some such ISP in the devel-
opment of his own particular natural and experimental histories. In the following example (see 
next section), the experiment I discuss belongs to a class of ISP called instances of the lamp. For 
a more general discussion on how experiments of light and ISPs enter into a natural history, see 
Jalobeanu (2011, 2013).
44 Novum organum, Book II, Aph. 5, OFB, vol. 11, p. 465.
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The list of the “Instances with Special Powers” constitutes the bulk of the second book 
of Novum organum; an unfinished part of the work, rather obscure and rarely visited 
by the modern scholar.45 They are, in Rees’ words, “labor-saving devices or shortcuts” 
providing “logical reinforcement to induction.”46 But ISPs are also model examples of 
relevant experiments that the investigator can successfully use in his construction of 
natural histories. Some classes of ISPs can be collected as sets of particular natural his-
tories right from the start; others require more elaborated treatment. They can be tools 
(i.e., the telescope, microscope, prism, other surveying instruments), experiments of 
various degrees of complexity, or even natural objects themselves.47 Prisms figure as 
IPS too:
For example, if you are investigating the nature of Colour, Solitary Instances are 
prisms, clear gems which show colours not just inside themselves, but outside 
on a wall, dew too etc.48
Therefore, a natural history of colors will definitely make use of, maybe even 
begin with, experiments devised with prisms.49 There are several classes of ISP play-
ing important parts at various stages in the production of a natural history. Some can 
constitute the very beginning of a natural history: such are the solitary instances, or 
the instances of the lamp. Others are of particular interest once a natural history takes 
off the ground and must examine conflicting interpretations of a given phenomenon. 
Such are the celebrated “crucial instances” for which Hooke coined, in Micrographia, 
the name “crucial experiment.”
In additions to the abovementioned rules, the writing of natural history has also 
some “extra useful features” of a more theoretical character.50 A natural history should 
45 Rees, “Introduction: The Novum organum in Context,” OFB, vol. 11, p. lxxvii–xcii.
46 OFB, vol. 11, p. lxxxviii. As Rees has shown, most of the ISPs are examples “drawn from bodies 
of ideas which Bacon had set down in a coherent form in earlier, and sometimes unfinished trea-
tises—for instance Phenomena universi, De fluxi et refluxu maris, Descriptio globi intellectualis, 
Thema coeli . . . These works Bacon withheld from publication, but he chose to disassemble their 
doctrines before cautiously infiltrating the disjecta membra into Novum organum. In Novum 
organum these materials were not fragmentary but deliberately fragmented. To exemplify ISPs 
Bacon robbed out his system of theories about the nature of things and, publishing them for the 
first time, set them forth dispersedly, and in such a way that perhaps he alone knew of the con-
nective tissue holding them together” (Rees, OFB, vol. 11, p. lxxxiii).
47 The loadstone is an exemplar of a ‘monadic instance,’ an object interesting enough by itself to 
be the starting point of a natural history.
48 Novum organum, Book II, Aph. 22, OFB vol. 11, p. 273.
49 Prisms are also methods of producing artificial rainbows, for Bacon, and hence instruments 
for studying natural phenomena in better experimental conditions than in nature.
50 OFB, vol. 11, p. 469.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Mon Feb 10 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199337095.indd   50 2/10/2014   7:52:17 PM
51 Constructing Natural Historical Facts
contain “questions” (queries) to direct the investigation and explanations of the experi-
mental setup “so that people will be free to make up their minds whether it is trustwor-
thy or not, and also that their industry will be stirred up to look for more exact ways 
(if possible) of doing experiment.”51 The natural history should also contain theoreti-
cal and methodological observations as well as rules directing the researcher—rules 
“which are nothing other than general and catholic observations.”52 In addition to what 
can be extracted from direct observation and experiment, natural histories can also 
contain summaries, glosses, provisional rules and axioms, and sometimes refutations 
of the received opinions and theories concerning certain phenomena.53 What is impor-
tant, however, is that all these elements are kept separate in the text, so that the reader 
can distinguish between them. In his Latin natural histories (Historia ventorum, 1622; 
Historia vitae et mortis, 1623; Historia densi et rari, 1658) Bacon used titles, margina-
lia, and up to six different fonts in order to distinguish between the various elements 
discussed above.
Last but not least, natural history should contain provisional rules (Cannones 
mobiles) or ‘imperfect axioms’ obtained in the course of inquiry. Such rules are not 
definitive laws of nature but provisional law-like regularities, or rules, obtained through 
experimentation that, in Bacon’s own natural histories, come at the very end of the 
investigation. They are also carefully distinguished from the rest, and they are placed at 
the end of a natural history, in a list of propositions followed by commentaries.
Therefore, a natural and experimental history is not any collection of facts or 
experiments, not even of experiments topically organized, but a collection of relevant 
experiments generated in a controlled manner, according to the “true order of experi-
ence.”54 Furthermore, the results are “ordered and digested” according to the above-
mentioned set of rules and directions.
2.3 “THE TRUE ORDER OF EXPERIENCE”: EXPERIENTIA 
LITERATA IN THE PROCESS OF DISCOVERY
For Bacon, one of the major impediments to the advancement of learning was the lack 
of a proper method of discovery. All traditional “manners of discovery” relied more on 
chance than on pure knowledge. Chance discoveries obtained by “mere experience”—
by ‘groping in the dark’55—were no better for Bacon than “that which the brute beasts 
51  Ibid.
52 OFB, vol. 11, p. 471.
53  Ibid.
54 OFB, vol. 11, p. 131.
55 OFB, vol. 11, p. 100.
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are capable . . . which is an extreme solicitude about some one thing, and perpetual 
practicing of it, such as the necessity of self-preservation impose on such animals.”56 
Bacon’s remedy is the invention of a new method that would transform “mere experi-
ence” into “experiment”: “a different method, order and process for keeping experience 
going and advancing it.”57 Instead of random experience, he proposes experiments 
generated “according to a certain law, step by step and steadily.”58 The method or art 
for achieving this, apart from Bacon’s famous interpretation of nature, is what Bacon 
calls experientia literata.
Learned (or literate) experience is an instrument through which the human intel-
lect can proceed from one experiment to another, as if “led by the hand” in the dark.59 
It is experience— disciplined and “put into writing”—in fact, formalized into a set of 
“rules” or “modes” which, applied in order, can be used to generate new experiments in 
an orderly manner. Its major characteristic is that it always begins and ends in experi-
ments, and, hence, it can constitute a good instrument for generating natural histo-
ries.60 In a late methodological writing, De augmentis scientiarum, Bacon formulates 
eight “rules” or “modes” of literate experience, of which the first is the experimental 
variation of parameters. Other such modes are the extension of a given experiment 
(through repetition in a different experimental setup), the translation (into a different 
domain), inversion, or coupling of experiments, etc. Through such a procedure, the 
experimenter extends his field of research and generates new knowledge.61 As a result:
a great heap of discoveries still awaits us, a heap which can be brought to light 
not only by unearthing hitherto unknown operations, but by transferring, put-
ting together and applying ones already known by means of what I have called 
literate experience.62
In fact, in the absence of a properly developed interpretatio naturae (or New Organon), 
literate experience is the only proper method of producing knowledge and our best 
56 Bacon, De augmentis scientiarum, SEH IV, p. 408.
57 OFB, vol. 11, p. 100.
58  Ibid.
59 There is currently debate as to what precisely Bacon meant by experientia literata. In what fol-
lows, I will build upon previous research, as well as Georgescu (2011), Jalobeanu (2011, 2013), 
and Pastorino (2011).
60 There is another debate in the literature relating to the more general purposes of experientia 
literata, to its functioning as an instrument of recording, etc. For the purpose of this paper, these 
are fine details that do not affect what I intend to show.
61 Georgescu (2011), Jalobeanu (2013). The precise ways in which Bacon put this method to 
work is the subject of my forthcoming book, Jalobeanu (forthcoming).
62 OFB, vol. 11, p. 169.
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hope of improving our knowledge. This, at least, is Bacon’s position in his own natu-
ral histories, the Latin natural histories developed during the last five years of his life 
under the generic title Historia naturalis et experimentalis.63
2.4 BACONIAN EXPERIMENTATION
At this point, an example of literate experience at work would clarify what was new 
and potentially interesting in Bacon’s natural and experimental histories. My example 
comes from one of the posthumous Latin natural histories, Historia densi et rari,64 and 
involves Bacon’s construction of one of the first tables of relative densities.65 The table 
is the result of a long string of experiments which originate in a special kind of ISP, 
what Bacon called “instances of the lamp.” They are special experiments able to extend 
the powers of the senses, or able to make visible the invisible processes and operations 
of nature. The experiment was developed relatively early in Bacon’s career and figures 
prominently among the ISPs in the second book of Novum organum as well as in one 
of Bacon’s most philosophical writings, Phenomena universi.66 It involves construct-
ing a cube of gold weighting one ounce, and two identical cubical recipients of silver 
that can contain the cube of gold. Then, the cube of silver—filled with the ounce of 
gold—is weighted against the empty recipient, with the help of a balance. Then, the 
empty silver recipient is filled with all sorts of substances. The relative weight at equal 
volume translates into relative densities. After repeating the weighting process with 
all the substances that he could lay his hands on, from quicksilver to “common earth,” 
and from milk to fir wood, Bacon draws the resulting experimental fact: a long list of 
relative densities called “A table of the Coition and Expansion of Matter in Relation to 
Space in Tangible Bodies with a computation of the proportion in different bodies.”
The construction of this natural history is revealing. HDR begins with the table 
presented as the experimental result of an experimental procedure carefully described 
so that it makes replication possible. In fact, Bacon emphasizes that he has compiled 
the table “many years ago” and, therefore, there is “no doubt that a much more accurate 
one could be put together.”67 The description of the experimental procedure is followed 
63 In the preface to the Historia naturalis et experimentalis (1622; hereafter HNE), Bacon claims 
that even if his Novum organum would be finished, it would be useless without natural history, 
while natural history by itself can contribute to the growth of knowledge and the advancement 
of sciences. OFB, vol. 12, p. 11–12.
64 Published by I. Gruter in 1658. Hereafter HDR.
65 For a more detailed historical reconstruction of this experiment, see Pastorino (2011).
66 OFB, vol. 6, also published by Gruter in 1658, in the same volume as Historia densi et rari.
67 OFB, vol. 11, p. 49.
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by a discussion concerning its limitations,68 and further open-ended questions. In this 
way, the reader is encouraged to try for himself to replicate the experiment and, maybe, 
to move a step forward and add new lines to the table. The results of the experiments 
are set down in a list of seven observations. It is a very heterogeneous list, contain-
ing more than one category of results. The very first observation, for example, states 
that the experiment is important because, by showing that there is a finite variation 
of densities in nature, it can give us hope that we will eventually find a place in this 
table for all the known substances in the universe. On the other hand, we are told 
that the table is provisional and unfinished, and we should not assume that the “wres-
tling match” with nature is over. The second use of the table is to “dispel fantasies and 
dreams.”69 More particularly, Bacon uses the table to refute Aristotle’s theory of the four 
elements: since there are many substances in the table that are heavier than “earth,” it is 
clear that when the Peripatetics are talking about the elemental “earth,” they are talking 
about a mysterious and unknown element “not available for mixture.”70
In addition to refuting alternative theories, the experimental fact (the table) is also 
useful for refuting common opinions and common expectations (for example, the 
common opinion that hard bodies are especially dense), and hence, has a pedagogical 
and therapeutic aspect. Bacon claims that it benefits our mind to realize that many 
experimental results are other than one might assume in the first place; by working 
against our expectation, experimental activity has pedagogical, epistemological, and 
therapeutic features.71 The table can be used to restrain and correct (cohibenda et corri-
genda) common assumptions about the regularity and order of Nature.72 Only the third 
observation provides what we would today consider the main result of the experiment, 
namely the fact that we can establish approximate quantitative laws of relative densi-
ties and, in particular, that the maximum variation of densities on the Earth is 32:1.73
68 The smallness of the vessel and its cubical shape made it less suitable for substances that can-
not be reduced to this shape and form. As a result, Bacon acknowledges that “as regards precise 
calculations, a certain degree of chance enters into the matter,” OFB, vol. 13, p. 47. The discussion 
is entitled “Advices,” and, as such, represents an important element in the construction of natural 
history (something that each reader has to take into consideration in order to be able to do his/
her own experiments).
69 “Nemo iatque expatietur, nemo fingat aut somniet.” OFB, vol. 12, p. 48.
70 OFB, vol. 13, p. 48–49.
71 Ibid., p. 53. These aspects are strongly related to Bacon’s beliefs that natural and experimental 
histories can also act as good medicines for the mind, that natural history is a serious instrument 
in fighting the idols of the mind, etc. See Corneanu (2011), Jalobeanu (2010a, 2012b).
72 Ibid., pp. 49–51.
73 The table is open ended, and Bacon clearly states that in the “bowels of the Earth” or in the 
heavens, one might find bodies with very different densities.
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These observations are interspersed with what Bacon calls “Directions,” i.e., new 
questions and suggestions for further experimentation. For example: Why is it that 
gold can be found not only in the depths of the Earth, but also on the surface, in the 
bed of various rivers? A line of investigation is open into the origins of such rivers: Do 
they proceed from “the bottom of mountains?”74 More generally, we can investigate 
“loades in general, to see which of them are usually deeper and which nearer to the 
surface of the Earth; and in what geographical situation and soils they arise. . . .”75
Another category of results are called “incentives to practice,” and they develop 
useful applications of the results obtained in the table. We are told, for example, that 
the table can be used as an instrument to discover the proportion of a substance in an 
alloy or a mixture.76
The “incentives to practice” are both extensions and applications of the table: we 
can inquire, for example, just by looking at the table, why there is a gap between 
stones and metals, or whether we can turn some of the substances in the table into 
some other substances, and through which procedures. What are the natural pro-
cesses that modify density? Is condensation a “real” modification of density or a 
“pseudo-densation”?77 In order to answer some of these questions, a new experiment 
is devised by a variation of the experimental conditions of the initial and setup: instead 
of weighting the substances in their ‘natural’ form, they are first reduced to different 
states of aggregation; they are, for example, transformed into powder, dissolved in 
other substances, or reduced to “liquors” or “spirits.” As a result, a new table is con-
structed, followed by the same list of observations, directions, advices, and incentives 
to practice.
Both tables are, in Bacon’s project, instances of a more complete table, still to be put 
together through experimental variation:
The two tables above are pretty meager. The only precise table of bodies and 
their openings would be one which displayed the weight of the individual bod-
ies first, then of their crude powders, next of their ashes, limes and rusts; next of 
their amalgamations, then of their vitrifications . . . then of their distillations . . . 
and of all other alterations of the same bodies; so that in this manner judgment 
may be formed of the openings of bodies and very closely knit connections of 
the nature in its whole state.78
74 OFB, vol. 13, p. 51.
75  Ibid.
76 Ibid., pp. 53–55.
77 Ibid., p. 55.
78 Ibid., p. 59.
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Such a complete table would accomplish Bacon’s purpose, which is to take a “census of 
tangible bodies family by family.”79 Its completion, however, is left to the reader, while 
Bacon moves to the second part of his natural history, which is the investigation of the 
“rare.” A full reconstruction of the structure and purpose of Bacon’s HDR is beyond my 
scope here. Instead, I propose to have a closer look to the relevant features of Baconian 
experimentation, as pictured in his strings of experiments leading to the construction 
of the table of densities.
Bacon treats his table as an experimental fact “constructed” at the end of a long, 
tedious, but carefully regulated process of experimentation. None of the results of the 
experimentation are treated as theoretical or speculative. They constitute experimental 
results of increased generality and their practical applications. Theoretical and meth-
odological elements are also introduced, but they are carefully distinguished as “obser-
vations,” “directions,” “advices,” or “incentives to practice.”
However, all this does not imply that there is no theory at work in Bacon’s natural 
histories. In fact, there is a fair amount of theoretical knowledge working at various 
levels in Bacon’s construction of experimental facts. Some of this theory is spelled out 
in the provisional rules, but it is clear that at least some of the provisional rules, like 
the general principle of conservation of matter, are presupposed in the very construc-
tion of the experiment.80 Equally presupposed in the experiment, although less obvi-
ous, is Bacon’s theory of tangible and pneumatic matter,81 according to which “dense” 
and “rare” bodies have opposing qualities. These theoretical elements, however, are not 
tested, but presupposed.
2.5 BACONIAN METHODOLOGY IN NEWTON’S 
PAPER ON LIGHT AND COLORS
Newton’s first published paper observes a good number of Bacon’s rules on how to 
write a natural history. It begins with relevant experiments (incidentally, prismatic 
refraction is also part of Bacon’s long list of the “Instances of Special Power”), as is 
befitting a good natural history. It moves from one experiment to the other by varying 
the parameters and variables of the experiment, constructing in this way experimen-
tal series with results of increased generality. It uses experiments to refute alternative 
theories and hypotheses. It separates the natural history and the doctrine, and ends 
79 Ibid., p. 61.
80 Manzo (1996).
81 The way in which matter theory enters into Baconian natural history/natural philosophy has 
been thoroughly discussed in the recent decades. For a sample of representative writings, see 
Giglioni (2010), Rees (1996), and Weeks (2007).
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the natural historical part with the results of the crucial experiment (re)constructed 
as a natural historical fact. If we compare Bacon’s experimental procedure for con-
structing the table of densities with Newton’s experimental procedure for getting to the 
results of experimentum crucis, we cannot fail to notice a number of striking similari-
ties (as well as important differences). Bacon’s table is the “constructed experimental 
fact,” as Newton’s result (that light is composed of rays of different refragibility) is an 
experimental fact obtained at the end of a carefully devised chain of experiments. The 
experimental procedure is sketched in both cases—detailed enough for the reader to 
attempt to replicate it, but not precise enough to make replication trivial. Taking up the 
experiment and attempted replication is, in natural history, a productive exercise for 
the mind and not a simply a procedure aimed at verifying evidence.82
Meanwhile, the controlled variation of experimental parameters is held responsible 
for the production of new experiments and experimental results. Another common 
feature is the multiple use of experiments. In both cases, experiments are said to refute 
competing theories. In both cases, the experiments are also said to produce useful 
results/applications, and such useful results are emphasized and explained (the pos-
sibility of determining the proportion of a substance in a mixture and the reflecting 
telescope, respectively). Last but not least, in both cases, natural history offers some 
causal explanations of the constructed facts without entering into metaphysical ques-
tions regarding the nature of density, or the nature of light. Needless to say, identifying 
similarities does not mean that there are no important differences between Bacon and 
Newton.
Despite such differences, however, there are good reasons to read at least the first 
part of Newton’s paper as an instantiation of Baconian natural history. I conclude by 
showing how a number of the allegedly mysterious or unclear features of Newton’s 
paper are clarified by my reading.
2.6 NEWTON’S READERS AND THE PROBLEM 
OF EXPERIMENTUM CRUCIS
It is clear from the parallels drawn above, that Newton’s paper is not intentionally 
obscure or nontransparent, as has been sometimes claimed. Indeed, Newton gives 
what would have been seen as a good enough description of his experimental pro-
cedure to encourage replication and further work on the nature of refraction.83 As a 
result, Newton’s correspondents not only attempted to replicate, but devised their own 
82 On Bacon’s use of experimentation in this way, see Jalobeanu (2011, 2013).
83 The fact that such replication is difficult is not necessarily due to the phrasing of the paper. In 
this issue, I am standing with Shapiro (1996) against Schaffer (1989).
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versions of Newton’s experiments. Such is, for example, the paper published by Robert 
Moray in no. 83 of the Philosophical Transactions under the title “Some experiments 
proposed in relation to Mr Newton’s Theory of light.” Moray’s experiments are gener-
ated through experimental variation of parameters applied to Newton’s first experi-
ment. For example, Moray asks what happens if the prism is partially covered with 
paper, or whether we can obtain a spectrum using light coming from Venus.
Another contentious issue regarding Newton’s paper concerns the relatively small 
number of experiments reported. As we have seen, there is no requirement in a 
Baconian natural history to begin with a large number of experiments. Experiments 
are generated through experientia literata on a very limited, sometimes very small 
number of instances of special power. The multiplication of experiments is not neces-
sary but can be done for pedagogical, practical, or “useful” purposes. Moreover, the 
first part of Newton’s paper gives enough material for the reader to understand that 
the experimental variation can generate (and did generate, during Newton’s optical 
researches) a very large number of experiments.
Similarly, as we have seen, Newton’s introduction of his reflecting telescope as a 
potential application of his novel discoveries is a standard feature of Baconian natural 
history and not the rhetorical attempt of a newcomer to ingratiate himself with the 
worthies of the Royal Society.
Last but not least, reading the first part of Newton’s paper as a Baconian natural 
history throws some light on the often-discussed issue of the crucial experiment. As 
we have seen, for Bacon, crucial instances play an important role in natural history.84 
They are experiments of particular relevance in discussing, evaluating, and refut-
ing alternative theories.85 They intervene when “the intellect is finely balanced” and 
“uncertain” which to choose between two or more alternative causal explanations.86 In 
some cases, crucial instances provide powerful arguments to refute a theory and good 
reasons to accept its competitor. In some other cases crucial instances are no more 
than reasons to grow “suspicious,” to “smell a rat, and go looking for other Crucial 
84 In the theory of crucial instances, Bacon ascribes for them a very important role in the inter-
pretation of nature. Meanwhile, all the crucial instances presented there as examples are experi-
ments he made use of in his natural histories in order to refute alternative theories.
85 OFB, vol. 11, p. 319: “In the fourteenth place among Instances with Special Powers I will set 
down Crucial Instances [Instantias Crucis], taking the name from signposts set up at forks to 
mark and point out the parting of the ways. These I have also grown used to call Decisive and 
Judicial Instances and, in certain cases, Instances of the Oracle and Instruction.” As all these 
names indicate, crucial instances play a very important role for Bacon. They “shed greatest light 
and carry great authority” (ibid., p. 321).
86 Ibid., pp.  319–321. Although Bacon formulates his examples by giving two alternatives to 
choose from, it is clear from the development of those examples that the two alternatives are not 
exclusive and that there may be more than two theories at stake.
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Instances on the matter.”87 Bacon himself suggests that crucial instances can play dif-
ferent roles: some might be called “Decisive and Judiciary,” while, “in some cases, [they 
are called] Instances of Oracle and Instruction.”88 This difference in terminology sug-
gests a difference in function:  in some cases, crucial instances can help the intellect 
decide definitively (as to which direction to go); in some other cases, they point to 
questions, puzzles, further problems, etc.89 My suggestion is that reading the whole 
theory of crucial instances solely in terms of evidence, although not entirely wrong, is 
slightly misleading.90 Crucial instances are (mostly) experiments; and, as all Baconian 
experiments, they are open ended, productive, and can be developed into a series of 
experiments and results. They can be used to generate whole natural histories.91 In 
some cases, they are useful because by refuting or questioning accepted theories, they 
free the mind to inquire further. In other cases, they offer examples of how things 
can be otherwise than in the received theories, without offering, at the same time, 
a positive confirmation of a particular theory. Here is one example: Bacon’s discus-
sion of the nature of the moon. According to the theories available, the moon was 
either a solid body (as Gilbert has stated) or a fiery one (as Bacon’s theory of matter 
states sometimes). The main argument of the “Moon is a solid body” camp was that 
since the surface of the moon reflects the rays of the sun, the moon cannot be a fiery 
body. A Crucial Instance, therefore, would be an experiment showing that one can 
have reflection of light on a fiery body. Bacon gave two such instances: the reflection of 
light on the luminous clouds, at sunrise or sunsets, and an actual experiment involving 
the reflection of a more powerful light on a less luminous flame:
We should perform an experiment of letting the Sun’s rays shine from a hole 
over any smoky or bluish flame. For indeed the Sun’s free rays falling on darker 
flames seems as it were to neutralize them so that they look more like white 
fumes than flames.92
In what way is this a crucial instance? Showing that reflection is possible on a 
flame refutes the major argument of the contending theory, but does not prove that 
the moon is made of fiery substance. At best, it opens a new line of experimentation 
into the nature of tangible and fiery matter and their respective properties. Therefore, 
87 Ibid., pp. 327, 331.
88 Ibid., p. 319.
89 Such questions, puzzles, etc. are, presumably, responses to a puzzling oracular instance.
90 For such a reading, see Urbach (1987).
91 In fact, the examples formulated by Bacon in the theory of crucial instances have all been used 
to develop natural histories either by himself or by his followers in the early Royal Society.
92 OFB, vol. 11, p. 333.
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crucial experiments function both as evidence and (probably more importantly) as 
core experiments from where new natural histories can be generated.
This is also the way in which Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke read Bacon’s theory 
of crucial instances. For example, in his natural history of colors, Boyle appealed some-
thing like Bacon’s theory of crucial instances in order to refute some of the six com-
peting alternative hypotheses on the nature of light.93 As for Hooke, as it has shown 
before, he coined the term experimentum crucis, starting from his own creative read-
ing of Bacon. It is highly relevant, I think, that Hooke’s experimentum crucis appears 
within a “natural historical account,”94 in the context of successive strings of Baconian 
experimentation regarding the production of colors in very thin plates. After establish-
ing that the production of colors does not depend on the material of the plate or on 
the nature and quality of the light source, but only on the thinness of the plate, Hooke 
claimed that, incidentally, Descartes’ theory about the production of colors is refuted. 
As a result:
This experiment therefore will prove such a one as our thrice excellent Verulam 
calls Experimentum Crucis, serving as a Guide or Land-mark, by which to 
direct our course in the search after the true cause of Colours. Affording 
us this particular negative information that for the production of Colours 
there is not necessary either a great refraction, as in Prisme; nor Secondly, 
a determination of Light and shadow, such as is both in the Prisme and  
Glass-ball.95
“This experiment” refers to the whole string of experiments performed so far. They 
offer, in Hooke’s view, “negative information,” and, in consequence, can be used to 
refute Descartes’ theory of colors. In this sense, the crucial experiment functions as 
a Baconian Crucial Instance, as “a guide or land-mark.” But the crucial experiment is 
not used to confirm a theory. In fact, again, the position of Hooke’s crucial experiment 
in the argumentative structure of Observation IX of Micrographia is extremely impor-
tant. It comes as a conclusion of a “historical” part and just before Hooke formulates 
his own hypothesis on the nature of light. It also plays the role of a turning point in the 
demonstration. Hooke claims:
Now that we may see likewise what affirmative and positive Instruction it 
yields, it will be necessary to examine it a little more particularly and strictly; 
93 Boyle (1664).
94 Observation IX of Micrographia; see also section 2 of this paper.
95 Hooke (1665, p. 54).
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which we may the better do, it will be requisite to premise somewhat in general 
concerning the nature of Light and Refraction.96
After formulating his own hypothesis on light, Hooke offers a new series of experi-
ments (refraction on thin plates and “Balls of water,” and prisms) destined to refute the 
Cartesian theory. They are all versions of the same experiment of refraction, obtained 
through experimental variations of relevant parameters. And they are also said to 
“afford” an “Instancia crucis”:
For is does very plainly and positively distinguish, and shew, which of the two 
Hypotheses, either the Cartesian or this is to be followed, by affording a genera-
tion of all the colors in the Rainbow, where according to Cartesian Principles 
there should be none at all generated. And secondly, by affording an instance 
that does more closely confine the cause of these Phenomena of colours to this 
present Hypothesis.97
It is clear that Hooke uses the crucial experiment in Bacon’s sense, as a guide in the 
investigative procedure; a crucial experiment can be used to refute a particular hypoth-
esis and give some support to another. It does not, however, confirm a hypothesis and 
it does not transform a hypothesis into an established truth.
It is not surprising, therefore, that when reading Newton’s paper, Hooke acknowl-
edges the “ingenious character” of the crucial experiment, but also asks the question 
regarding the theory that this experiment supposedly refutes. He points out that the 
Newton experiment does not refute his own hypothesis (in the same way in which 
his crucial experiments refuted Descartes’ theory).98 In the course of their subsequent 
correspondence and debate, Hooke emphasizes more than once that Newton has a 
mistaken understanding of “crucial instance” and “crucial experiment,” and, hence, 
that his paper gives a distorted and illegitimate reading of the term. In fact, Hooke’s 
first objections to Newton’s paper are easy to understand if read from the perspective of 
Baconian natural history, as I have tried to reconstruct here. They fall into three cate-
gories: first, Hooke raises objections against some of Newton’s experimental results and 
suggests improvements or alternative experiments. This is a perfectly legitimate reac-
tion in natural historical research (it is, in fact, the reaction expected from a serious 
96 Hooke (1665, p. 59).
97  Ibid.
98 Following Bechler, I suggest that Hooke did not reject Newton’s hypothesis, but regarded it as 
a “very ingenious” and fair competitor; hence, he was willing to take it into consideration and to 
imagine further experiments to test and improve it. This was also Huygens’ initial reaction. See 
Bechler (1974).
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reader). Second, Hooke signals two more serious philosophical problems: that Newton 
used his own term, experimentum crucis, in an illegitimate way, and that he claims 
a degree of certainty for his demonstrations, which is highly problematic in natural 
history.
2.7 CONCLUSION
My aim in this paper was to show that a good number of traditional difficulties in 
reading Newton’s first paper on light and colors disappear if one reads it in the key of 
the genre to which it properly belongs, namely Baconian natural history. Using recent 
developments in the scholarship, I have offered a historical and philosophical recon-
struction of Francis Bacon’s natural historical project, outlining some of its important 
elements. I  have shown that Newton’s first paper displays such elements of natural 
history both in its structure, (formal) composition, and its experimental content. As 
recommended by Bacon, Newton constructed his experimental research in a series of 
experiments generated from one another by controlled variation of parameters. Like 
Bacon, Newton attempted to present all his results as experimental results, “facts” con-
structed directly from experiment. This allowed him to give a special status to his main 
result, i.e., the different degrees of refrangibility. Meanwhile, in taking Hooke’s phrase, 
“crucial experiment” and giving it a new meaning, Newton extended too far a step that 
was otherwise standardly used in critical reflection on the powers and advantages of 
natural history, giving it a dogmatic twist of which neither Bacon, nor Hooke could 
have approved.
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